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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellant challenges trial court's interpretation 
of section 79-29-1. U. C. A. (1990). The appellate 
court will review de novo questions of statutory 
interpretation for correctness without giving deference 
to the trial court's interpretations. State v. 
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991); Birdwell v. 
Skeen, 983 f2d 1332, 1336 (5th Cir. 1993). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) is 
intended to remedy hardships resulting from the use of 
detainers and to eliminate potential abuses of the 
detainer system. United States v. Dixon, 592 F.2d 329 
(6th Cir. 1979). The law states that "[T]his agreement 
shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its 
purposes." U.C.A. 77-29-5 Article IX (1994). The 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers is held to standards 
of substantial compliance with the terms of the 
agreement and fundamental fairness in the overall 
result. Hearn v. State, 642 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A. While A Prisoner May Temporarily Waive Some of 
His Rights under the IAD, Such Waivers are for Specific 
and Limited Time Periods. 
A prisoner's IAD rights may be waived for good 
cause. Gray v. Benson 608 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1979). 
Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1987). 
Failure to invoke Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
time limit in a speedy trial motion is not a waiver. 
United State v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 151 (1978). 
Waiver of IAD rights is a threshold issue in this 
case. Appellee points out that authorities are split 
on this matter. Brief of Appellee 13. Waiver of 
rights is not mentioned in the language of the IAD 
itself. U.C.A. 77-29-5, et sea. (1994) . Since 
eliminating obstruction to "programs of prisoner 
treatment and rehabilitation" comprises the purpose of 
the IAD, allowing any and all waivers would not be in 
keeping with the spirit of the law. U.C.A. 77-2 9-5 Art. 
I. Any continuances granted by the court must strictly 
comply with the provisions of the Act itself (Art. IV 
(c) . 
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Case law precedent provides that if a defendant 
requests a delay, the defendant cannot assert that time 
as grounds for dismissal. State v. Stillinqs, 709 P.2d 
348 (Utah 1985). Continuances requested by defendant 
"temporarily waive[d] his right to a speedy trial." 
State v. Phathammavonq, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993). 
Appellee advances the argument that one may entirely 
waive IAD rights. Brief of Appellee 13-16. However, 
waivers are much more specific and narrow, applying 
only to reasonable periods of time granted for good 
cause, and rights are waived only temporarily. Id.; 
State v. Stillinqs, 709 P.2d 348, 349 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982), and 
Art. Ill(a) and Art. IV(c). In this instance, 
Brocksmith's waivers were not specific as to time 
waived, periodically ambiguous, and insufficient under 
the law to apply. See discussion on pp. 5-13, infra. 
B. The Burden of Substantial Compliance with the 
Terms of the IAD is on the Appellee Receiving State. 
The language in the IAD compels the conclusion 
that the legislature intended to place the burden of 
compliance with the statute on the State. U.C.A. 
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77-29-1(4). The statute reads: "If the court finds 
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have 
the matter heard within the time required is not 
supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the 
matter dismissed with prejudice." Id. 
Justice Blackmun, in a recent dissent addressing 
the issue of waiver of IAD rights alluded to but not 
ruled upon by the plurality states: 
[T]he IAD itself does not require dismissal 
for a violation of its 120-day limit only "upon 
motion of the defendant," much less "upon 
defendant's timely oral objection to the 
setting of the trial date." Instead, the statute 
unambiguously directs courts to dismiss charges 
when the time limits are breached. This arguably 
puts the responsibility on courts and states to 
police the applicable time limits. 
Reed v. Farley, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 2291 (1994) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
The IAD similarly speaks to the duty of state 
agencies to cooperate. U.C.A. 77-29-7 (1994). The 
Attorney General is the central administrator of and 
information agent for the agreement on detainers. 
U.C.A. 77-29-11 (1994). The Attorney General shall 
provide information necessary to the effective 
operation of the agreement. U.C.A. 77-29-5 Art. VII 
(1994). 
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This is consistent with the views of Justice 
Blackmun on this issue, who states: "[T]his is a 
reasonable choice for Congress to make. Judges and 
prosecutors are players who can be expected to know the 
IAD's straightforward requirements and to make a simple 
time calculation at the outset of the proceedings 
against a transferred defendant." Reed, 114 S. Ct. 
2291 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
C. Defendant did not waive his IAD rights under 
Art. IV. 
Appellee claims that appellant Brocksmith waived 
his rights under the IAD. Brief of Appellee 15. The 
first alleged waiver ostensibly occurred on 11 May 
1992. Appellee proffers a minute entry supporting this 
conclusion. This entry ambiguously states: "— 
DEFENDANT WAIVES TIME—"; the document is unsigned and 
the IAD is not mentioned, and no "good cause" is 
recited. (R. 236). Considering appellant's numerous 
previous references to his IAD rights, the court's 
ambiguity does not meet the requisite fundamental 
fairness test for a valid waiver. Hearn, 642 P.2d 757 
(Utah 1982). More importantly, it violates Art. IV(c) 
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of IAD by failing to comply with the five prerequisites 
cited: "In respect to any proceeding made possible by 
this article, trial shall be commenced within one 
hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in 
the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open 
court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the 
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any 
necessary or reasonable continuance." Art. IV(c). 
While it is true that courts traditionally enjoy 
wide discretion in granting or denying continuances, 
continuances under IAD are unique and specific. Art. 
IV(c) establishes five distinct requirements to 
legitimize a continuance which would toll the 120 days 
of Art. IV. They are: (1) the court must have 
competent jurisdiction; (2) the grant of continuance 
must be in open court; (3) the prisoner or his attorney 
must be present; (4) the movant must demonstrate good 
cause, and (5) the length of the continuance must be 
reasonable or necessary. These strict requirements are 
"indubitably a reflection of the signatory states' 
great concern with the harmful effects caused by 
detainers." See Thomas R. Clark, The Effect of 
Violations of The IAD on Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 
-6-
54 fordham L.R. 1209 (1986). 
Read the Minute Entry of May 11, 1992 upon which 
Appellee relies. "Motion to Dismiss has been filed and 
State has not responded yet — court states that a 
Motion for Speedy Trial is not applicable." Where is 
the good cause? If any cause at all can be identified, 
it is because the State has failed to timely respond to 
Brocksmith's Motion to Dismiss originally filed in 
1990, renewed in March of 1991 and renewed yet again on 
February 24, 1992. And for that, the State wants to 
charge these days to defendant! 
Let the record be clear on this point: Defendant 
acknowledges the temporary tolling of time pursuant to 
his own motions for extensions of time which might 
otherwise have delayed a trial date if the court 
complies with Art. IV(c). Stillinqs, 709 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1985). On 11 May 1992 an arraignment occurred in 
District Court wherein a four-day jury trial was set to 
begin on 7 July 1992. Record 370. The minute entry is 
unclear on this point in that it states: "DEFENDANT 
WAIVES TIME" after also saying that: "COURT STATES A 
MOTION FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT APPLICABLE." Id. The 
court erred by ruling that Brocksmith's right to a 
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speedy trial was null, void, and somehow "not 
applicable". Furthermore, the court failed to comply 
with Art. IV(c). 
The minute entry is signed by no one, the IAD is 
not mentioned, and the only cause for the continuance 
appears to be the allowance for the State to file a 
response to the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
Appellee wants this court to presume that this and 
other waivers " . . . encompassed both his 
constitutional and his statutory speedy trial rights 
where there is nothing in the record to the contrary." 
Brief of Appellee 16 f.n. 7. Appellee then cites as 
authority for its urging this court to presume a waiver 
of rights State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 788 (Utah 
App. Ct. 19). Harrison does not in fact stand for such 
a presumption at all. Mr. Brocksmith suggests that it 
is a constitutionally infirm presumption to waive 
rights on crucial matters such as speedy trial and IAD 
provisions. Stillincrs, 709 P.2d 348 (Utah 1985), 
Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 f2d 1332, 1340, (5th Cir. 1993). 
As mentioned, the 11 May 1992 minute entry creates 
ambiguity by previously stating: "COURT STATES THAT A 
MOTION FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT APPLICABLE." What 
-8-
does this mean? It is either an incorrect ruling which 
induced Brocksmith to temporarily waive his IAD time, 
or it is a clearly erroneous and highly prejudicial 
conclusion by the court that Brocksmith's 
constitutional speedy trial and IAD rights are somehow 
suspended. Regardless of which conclusion one chooses, 
the fundamental fairness standard required under 
precedent was violated. Hearn, 642 P.2d 757 (Utah 
1982). Brocksmith's "waiver" of time in this instance 
cannot fairly be attributed to him. 
The second alleged waiver is an equally dubious 
citation to an 8 June 1992 court minute entry which 
reads: "—DEFENDANT WAIVES HIS SPEEDY TRIAL TIME—". 
(R. 376). This waiver may be based on the 11 May 1992 
erroneous court ruling mentioned immediately above. 
Again, no signatures appear, the IAD is not 
specifically mentioned, and that court then grants a 
continuance for 127 days, neither reasonable nor 
necessary. 
U.C.A. 77-29-1(4) suggests that unlike here, a 
continuance cannot be open-ended: "In the event the 
charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or 
within such continuance as has been granted," sanctions 
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provided for shall apply, i.e. dismissal of the charges 
(emphasis added). The fundamental fairness standard 
required by Hearn and the incompatibility of open-ended 
extensions with purpose of IAD recited in Birdwell 
compels the court to set closed-ended trial settings 
within reasonable periods of time to effectuate the 
underlying protections of the IAD. Id. Open-ended 
continuances similar to that granted in this instance 
would appear to violate the beneficial purposes recited 
in Article I of the IAD. U.C.A. 77-29-5 Art. I. 
Consequently, Appellant should be chargeable with only 
a reasonable amount of time growing from his 
continuance, that is, no more than 30 days beyond the 7 
July 1992 trial setting, as opposed to what ultimately 
was a 127 day delay in re-setting the matter for trial. 
Appellant suggests that under Art. IV(c), he 
cannot be said to have temporarily waived his speedy 
trial or Art. IV time. But in any event, any waiver 
was for a reasonable but not indeterminate period of 
time. The State wrongfully suggests to this court that 
such a waiver lasted from 8 June 1992 until 13 January 
1993, a period of 219 days. Brief of Appellee 39-40. 
Defendant suggests that any alleged waiver of a speedy 
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trial on 8 June 1992 was not an open-ended allowance 
for the prosecutor or the court to extend the time in 
perpetuity, especially since Mr. Brocksmith was 
incarcerated in Utah the entire time and denied the 
benefits of the rehabilitative program otherwise 
offered. No more than 30 days should be attributed to 
Mr. Brocksmith, since no specific IAD waiver occurred 
on 8 June 1992. 
The third court minute entry relied on by 
appellee, dated 13 October 1992, states: "—DEFENDANT 
WAIVES INTERSTATE AGREEMENT TIME". No signatures 
appear. The second requirement under Art. IV(c) is 
that the continuance must be in open court. This does 
not appear to have occurred. No such motion is 
referenced and no such motion is granted. The fourth 
criteria also appears deficient, in that no good cause 
is recited by a movant for a continuance. Trial was 
set two days later for October 26, 1992, so obviously 
no continuance was granted. Even if deemed a valid 
waiver by the court, this is a temporary waiver of IAD 
rights granted for good cause for a reasonable period 
of time. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 
1993). 
-11-
The final documentation of appellant's alleged 
waiver of IAD rights directly states said rights were 
waived. However, the document is a result of the 
county attorney's request for a written record of the 9 
November 1992 motion hearing. The document was drafted 
by the Cache County Attorney and appears to comply with 
four of the five requirements of Art. IV(c). It fails 
on criteria five, the provision which requires that the 
length of the continuance be reasonable and necessary. 
The trial setting went from November 18, 1992 to 
January 13, 1993, a period of 56 days. Such a lengthy 
extension is neither reasonable or necessary, 
especially in light of the fact that the Utah Supreme 
Court denied Brocksmith's interlocutory appeal on 
November 20, 1992 (see record 733). Record 681-2, 734-
7. This waiver, if deemed valid by this court, is also 
a temporary waiver of IAD rights. Phathammavong, 860 
P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993). 
But the question this court must ask itself is: 
"What happened to the October 26, 1992 trial setting?" 
Extension #3 (dated October 13, 1992) and relied on by 
State, is a minute entry which states: "A THREE DAY 
JURY TRIAL IS TO BE SET SOON." Record 579. 
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That jury trial was set two days later to begin on 
October 26, 1992. No motion to continue that new trial 
setting is produced by the State, no minute entry is 
offered, no documentation of any kind which even 
remotely satisfies the mandatory requirements of Art. 
IV(c). In short, none of the time between October 26, 
1992 and November 18, 1992 can be attributed to 
Appellant. 
There is in the record no verifiable and 
intentional waiver of appellant's IAD rights arising 
from the first two waivers relied on by the State. 
Under IAD Article IV, the State must try the defendant 
within 120 days. Even if the court attributes 
defendant with continuance numbers 3 & 4, in spite of 
their deficiencies detailed in Art. IV(c), 328 days 
still passed from his entry into the state to his 
trial. At least 212 of the 328 days must be counted 
against the State under Art. IV. 
POINT II 
THE STATE VIOLATED THE IAD ART. Ill 
A. Defendant was not Brought to Trial in a Timely 
Fashion. 
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The IAD's purpose is to expeditiously dispose of 
charges outstanding against a prisoner and to resolve 
detainers based on untried indictments/ informations or 
complaints. U.C.A. 77-29-1 (1994). The IAD delineates 
the necessary procedure, which begins only after a 
detainer has been "filed with the custodial (sending) 
State by another State (receiving) having untried 
charges pending against the prisoner; to obtain 
temporary custody the receiving State must also file an 
appropriate request with the sending State." Mauro, 
436 U. S. at 343-44. Custodial officials must then 
notify the prisoner of the detainer. U.C.A. 77-29-5 
Art. Ill(c). 
The prisoner can trigger the IAD protections by 
filing a written request for disposition of the 
detainer charges with the custodial official. U.C.A. 
77-29-5 (1994). The IAD requires that the custodial 
official forward the request for disposition to the 
court and the prosecutor in the receiving state. 
Crosland v. State, 857 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 1993). Upon 
receiving the request the receiving state must bring 
the prisoner to trial within 180 days. IAD art. 
Ill(a). 
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Utah lodged an official detainer against appellant 
on 26 June 1991. Brief of Appellee 5. Appellant 
contends that this detainer was actually the third 
detainer filed by the State, and the IAD requirements 
triggering a 180-day time limit for prosecution had 
been met on the date of Appellant's entry into his term 
of imprisonment, 4 June 1991. Appellant's brief, p. 
9.1 IAD Article IV allows a defendant 30 days to 
challenge his transfer to the receiving state, which 30 
days Brocksmith utilized. Brief of Appellant 9-10. 
This statutory review exercised by Appellant, from 25 
July 1991 to 24 August 1991, should not be counted 
1
 On 3 April 1990, a Special Agent for the Utah Attorney 
General's Office sent a certified felony warrant of arrest and a 
letter to the Mercer County (111.) Sheriff requesting that Mercer 
County hold Brocksmith [the Defendant] for Utah authorities when 
Illinois state and federal proceedings were complete. (R. 519, 
586). On 2 August 1990, the Utah Attorney General's Office again 
sent a certified copy of a felony warrant of arrest and a letter 
to the United States Marshal in Springfield, Illinois, 
requesting: "you hold Brocksmith [Defendant] for Utah authorities 
when Illinois federal criminal proceedings are finished. (R. 
166, 399). Both requests are arguably detainers, which are 
defined as "a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the 
institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking that the 
prisoner be held for the agency, or that the agency be advised 
when the prisoner's release is imminent." Fex v. Michigan, 
U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 1085 (1993). 
If the requests by Utah officials that Defendant be detained 
are held to be detainers under the IAD, then delivery of notice 
to the court and the prosecutor of Defendant's desire to have his 
charges resolved per the IAD triggers the 180 day clock no later 
than 4 June 1991. 
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against defendant since it is demonstrably incorporated 
into the legislation by virtue of the longer period of 
time granted to the receiving state under Article III 
vis-a-vis Article IV. U.C.A. 77-29-5 Articles III and 
IV (1990). It is presumably part of the differential 
between the 180 days of Art. Ill and the 120 days of 
Art. IV. 
Appellee maintains that appellant never properly 
notified Utah authorities of his intention to exercise 
his IAD rights, and hence should be denied the IAD 
protections which are otherwise rightfully his. Brief 
of Appellee 25-7. But Utah authorities had de facto 
notice of appellant's multiple written invocations of 
IAD rights. See 7 February 1990 demand for final 
disposition (Record 308); Motion to Dismiss of 24 
February 1992 (Record 105-25); 26 March 1992 hearing 
by Utah District Court on defendant's Request for Final 
Disposition (Record 248, 314, 340, 341, and 498); 
Motion to Dismiss of 1 May 1992 (Record 211-34); 
Motion for Declaration of Invalidity dated 2_ August 
1992 (Record 591-611); and Interlocutory Appeal dated 
26 October 1992 (Record 669). That is adequate. 
Crosland v. State, 857 P.2d 943, 947 (Utah 1993) (Howe, 
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C.J., concurring, Stewart and Zimmerman, JJ., joining 
in the concurrence), would place the burden on the 
prosecution to bring appellant to trial in the 
requisite 180-day time period when cle facto notice had 
been received. 
B. Appellee Attributes an Exaggerated Amount of 
Time to Defendant. 
1. Only Motions to Continue, granted in 
compliance with five reguirements of Art. IV(c). Toll 
the IAD Clock. 
Appellant requests that this court review the 
trial court's granting of continuances to determine 
whether they were reasonable and for good cause. See 
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). Motions other 
than motions to continue, such as motions to dismiss, 
are not attributable to defendant. Stillings, 770 P.2d 
137 (Utah 1989); Birdwell vs. Skeen, 983 f2d 1332 (5th 
Cir. 1993). Motions must be dealt with in an 
expeditious manner by the court. Phathammavong, 860 
P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah App. 1993); U.C.A. 77-29-5 Art. I 
(1990) . 
Appellee contends that time attributable to 
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defendant's dilatory tactics adds up to 505 days, and 
that defendant's trial therefore began within the IAD 
time limit. Brief of Appellee 40. While delays 
attributable to continuances requested by the defendant 
do toll the IAD time constrictions, non-continuance 
procedural motions, such as motions to dismiss, do not 
toll the IAD time clock. Stillinqs, 770 P.2d 137 (Utah 
1985); Birdwell, ibid. The State has inflated time 
attributable to the defendant. Brief of Appellee 39-
40. 
Of the 565 days from the State's filing of its 
third detainer to the date of trial, 116 are arguably 
attributable to defendant. That leaves 44 9 days under 
both Art. Ill and Art. IV that the State failed in its 
burden to bring defendant to trial. 
2. Delays During the Article III Period are 
Improperly Attributed to Defendant. 
In an apparent attempt to cover its administrative 
incompetence in executing its duty under the IAD, the 
State argues that " . . . Defendant's efforts to resist 
extradition delayed Utah's ability to comply with 
Article III . . .." Brief of Appellee 38. But it is 
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the State's burden, not Mr. Brocksmith's, to comply 
with the time frames established under the IAD. 
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991). 
The State fails to explain why it took 237 days 
after it filed its request for temporary custody to get 
Mr. Brocksmith to Utah. The State has failed to 
produce a single document filed by Mr. Brocksmith in a 
court of competent jurisdiction which actually hindered 
the State from its statutory obligation. The State has 
failed to produce even a single document which would 
arise to a legal basis for the court to have prevented 
extradition. The State has failed to produce even a 
single document which would constitute a legal 
impediment to the State's efforts to return Mr. 
Brocksmith to Utah. 
Of course Mr. Brocksmith did not want to return to 
Utah. He told Utah he did not voluntarily want to go 
in a letter dated 7 July 1991, to the Assistant 
Attorney General for the State of Utah, copied to the 
Cache County Attorney: 
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"Dear Sir: Please be advised that this is "NOT" a 
request for final disposition of the aforementioned 
[sic] matter, and that I will contest any trancefer 
[sic] to your jurisdiction as being a violation of my 
rights." 
"The record will reveal that my IAD rights have 
been violated, and the serious issue of Speedy Trial 
raised on the Federal level, but that within the 
charges themselves another clear violation of a 
Constitutional Right has been violated. Suffice it to 
say, I am aware of my rights and will zealously pursue 
them. Sincerely, Jack Brocksmith." Record 332. 
Why did he write such a letter? Because he 
obviously believed Utah had already violated his IAD 
protections, and he did not want to waive the IAD 
benefits by validating the State's prior misconduct 
with his acquiescence and consent. 
But that very letter puts Utah on notice of his 
reliance of the provisions of IAD — not his 
abandonment of its provisions. It was de facto notice 
of his reliance on the IAD to the very prosecutors who 
then dallied another 227 days before finally getting 
him to Utah. Crosland, 857 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
The State's argument suggests that defendant's 
letter so cowed the Utah authorities that his letter 
alone paralyzed the State's efforts to return him to 
Utah until 19 February 1992. 
Appellee concedes 589 days between 4 June 1991 
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through 13 January 1993. Brief of Appellee 39. It 
then mistakenly attributes 228 days of delay to Mr. 
Brocksmith between the July 7, 1991 letter cited above 
and his return to Utah. No legal citation for this 
attribution is provided. Brocksmith contends that 
under the language of the IAD, zero (0) days are 
attributable to him between the detainer and his return 
to Utah. IAD Article III (a) provides that the 
appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's 
jurisdiction " . . . may grant any necessary or 
reasonable continuance" — but only if good cause is 
shown and the prisoner or his counsel are present for 
the continuance. U.C.A. 77-29-5 Art. Ill (a). No such 
showing has been made by the State. It failed to even 
once comply or attempt to comply with the strict and 
specific requirements of Art. Ill (a), which 
requirements constitute the only way under the statute 
to toll the running of the 180 days. 
Defendant challenges the State to produce evidence 
of its efforts to toll even one single day from the 260 
days between 4 June 1991, when he entered upon his term 
of imprisonment, and 19 February 1992, when he returned 
to Utah. Even one. The State cannot. And whose 
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burden is it to initiate the tolling of the time? It 
is the State's burden. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 
1991); U.C.A. 77-29-5 Art. 1(4). 
IAD Article IV(a) creates a thirty day period for 
the governor of the sending state to disapprove the 
request for temporary custody or availability, "either 
upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner." 
U. C. A. 77-29-5 Art. IV(a) (1990). If the court 
decides to count the thirty day review against the 
Appellant, Appellant would have this court use the 24 
August 1991 expiration date of the review period as the 
date to start the clock against the Utah prosecution. 
The State thereafter attributes an additional 39 
days as waived by defendant from 24 February to 2 April 
1992 because he filed a Motion to Dismiss. Where under 
the language of the IAD does it suggest that the filing 
of a Motion to Dismiss constitutes a tolling of the 
time provisions under either Article III or Article IV? 
The State provides no authority, but rather ignores its 
own duty to have sought a Motion for Continuance based 
upon any alleged delay caused by defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. The State failed to do so, and cannot now 
take advantage retroactively of its own lack of 
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diligence. 
In fairness to the State, it is unlikely that the 
court would have tolled the time period in any event 
because none of the motions save the Motions for 
Continuance would have necessarily delayed the trial 
settings. See Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 f.2d 1332 (5th 
Cir. 1993). In fact, the time is chargeable against 
the defendant only when his motions necessarily delay 
trial. Stillincrs, 709 p.2d 348 (Utah 
1985);Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993). 
The State makes no argument that defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss on 24 February 1992 delayed his trial or 
somehow prejudiced the ability of the State to seek a 
trial within the IAD time limits, 
CONCLUSION 
Charges were filed against Mr. Brocksmith on 
December 21, 1989. On October 31, 1989, he invoked the 
speedy trial rights afforded by the Constitution. On 
February 7, 1990, he sought disposition of charges 
under IAD. 237 days elapsed between the filing of the 
State's third detainer and his return to Utah. 
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Defendant arrived in Utah on 19 February 1992. 
Record 252, 603. Article IV of the IAD states: "(c) In 
respect of any proceeding made possible by this 
article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred 
twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the 
receiving state." U.C.A. 77-29-5 Art. IV (1990). The 
jury was sworn on 13 January 1993. Record 804-8. This 
is an eleven month period during which defendant was 
kept in Utah, away from his rehabilitative program. 
The right to a trial within 120 days inuring to 
defendant was clearly violated when the continuances 
granted by the trial court are scrutinized for 
reasonableness and for meeting the good cause standard 
for granting continuances in an IAD-detainee context. 
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421. Lack of due diligence by the 
State, a violation of the fundamental fairness 
doctrine, violation of speedy trial rights and repeated 
violations of IAD compel this court to dismiss the 
conviction entered on January 13, 1993, or to remand 
the matter to the District Court with instructions to 
allow withdrawal of the guilty plea and to thereafter 
dismiss the charges before the court. 
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